The uncertainty of firms' future payoffs is the dominant factor in explaining stock return volatility at the firm level. However, financial statement numbers (e.g. dividends, accounting earnings) only provide a limited measure of expected payoffs, as they do not reflect firms' fundamentals on a timely basis. We demonstrate theoretically and empirically that information about firms' fundamentals contained in analysts' forecasts (which we label as "non-accounting information") is expected to 
Introduction
In theory, unexpected stock returns are caused by cash-flow news, expected return news, or both. Thus, a change in the volatility of a market fundamental, either future cash flows or discount rates, causes a change in the volatility of stock returns.
Utilizing the Campbell and Shiller (1988a, 1988b) loglinear valuation formula and a variance decomposition approach, prior studies find that variation in stock returns at the market level is primarily driven by variation in expected return news (Campbell 1991; Campbell and Ammer 1993) , while the variation in cash-flow news accounts for most of the variation in firm-level stock returns (Vuolteenaho 2002; Callen and Segal 2004) . However, studies conducted at the market level have typically used dividends as a surrogate for future cash flows, despite the longstanding recognition that dividends are "smoothed" (Lintner 1956 ). 1 The use of accounting earnings as an alternative proxy for future cash flows (Sadka 2007) also faces difficulties. Accounting earnings reflect transaction-based revenue recognition and the accompanying matching of expenses, so they are unlikely to be a particularly timely source of information about changes in fundamentals (Kothari 2001) . In contrast to earlier studies, we propose and test a simple rational model of how uncertainty about firm's fundamentals as evidenced in analysts' forecasts influences future systematic and idiosyncratic volatility. We term this "non-accounting information" (or "other information"), consistent with our application of linear information dynamics as in Ohlson (1995) . Our theoretical insight stems from incorporating Ohlson's linear information dynamics into the accounting version of the Campbell-Shiller model (Campbell and Shiller 1988; Vuolteenaho 2002) . We establish a theoretical link between non-accounting information and stock return volatility, and find that the conditional variance of non-accounting information is part of the conditional variance of stock returns. Our main hypothesis is rather intuitive.
Given the assumption of market efficiency, if current non-accounting information is more uncertain, thereby increasing the uncertainty of firm's future cash flows, future stock returns are expected to be more volatile. 1 A recent exception at the market level is Sadka (2007) , who uses accounting earnings instead of dividends and shows that cash flow news can explain most of the variation in the dividend-price ratio even at the aggregate level.
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In applying insights from Ohlson's (1995) linear information dynamic, an obvious issue to be addressed is how to measure such non-accounting information, although Ohlson (2001) states that "analysts' consensus forecasts of next-year's earnings would seem to be a reasonable measure of expected earnings". Therefore, we operationalize non-accounting information in two ways. Our first approach parallels the method used by Ohlson and Shroff (1992) and Manry et al. (2003) for identifying new information in reported earnings (i.e., unexpected earnings). The non-accounting information variable is measured as the residual from regressing one-year-ahead analysts' forecasts of future earnings on current publicly available financial information. Our second approach follows Dechow et al. (1999) , who measure non-accounting information as analysts' consensus forecasts minus earning forecasts predicted from past financial accounting information.
We conduct our empirical analysis at the firm level, where stock returns are predominantly driven by cash-flow news (Vuolteenaho 2002; Callen and Segal 2004) , because firm-level stock return volatility is important for both managers and shareholders.
2 Using data from the merged Compustat, CRSP and I/B/E/S databases for the period from 1981 to 2003, we show that the volatility of non-accounting information is positively associated with the variance of future stock returns, even after controlling for other known determinants of stock return volatility. We further examine whether the uncertainty of non-accounting information (mainly) drives the cross-sectional differences in systematic or idiosyncratic risk. Using the CAPM and the Fama-French three factor model (Fama and French 1993, 1996) as benchmarks to decompose total volatility its systematic and idiosyncratic components, we find a significant relation between the uncertainty of non-accounting information and both the systematic and idiosyncratic components of volatility.
Our results are robust to several different measures of stock return volatility, different 2 Reasons why volatility is important include the relation between perceived riskiness and cost of capital (Froot et al. 1992) ; high stock return volatility can make stock-price-based compensation less effective and more costly (Baiman and Verrecchia 1995) ; evidence that investment strategies based on volatility can earn statistically and economic significant abnormal returns (e.g. Ang et al. 2006) ; and finally, the price of an option on an individual stock depends on the volatility of its return, and accordingly, arbitrageurs who trade to exploit the mispricing of an individual stock face risks related to firm-level volatility in the sense that larger pricing error may be associated with higher return volatility (Shleifer and Vishny 1997). We also examine the effect of non-accounting information news (the signed level of non-accounting information) on stock return volatility. Non-accounting information news can be thought of as an aggregate indicator of all value-relevant events that have yet to have an impact on the financial statements. Previous studies provide consistent evidence that stock return volatility increases after the release of firm-specific news (e.g. Beaver 1968; Atiase and Bamber 1994), and also that volatility increases more in response to unfavourable news (Engle and Ng 1993; Skinner and Sloan 2002; Chan 2003) , a result that can be understood in the context of regime-switching, rational models (David 1997; Veronesi 1999) . Given the nature of volatility clustering (Mandelbrot 1963; Schwert 1989) , the effect of non-accounting information news on current volatility tends to continue and thus influence future volatility. Although we lack theoretical predictions from our model, we find empirically that both favourable and unfavourable non-accounting information news is associated with increased future stock return volatility, and the extent of this response does not differ significantly once we control for firm characteristics (e.g. ROE, firm size, financial leverage).
Our theoretical framework and empirical tests extend prior research based on the Campbell-Shiller loglinear valuation formula and variance decomposition approach (Campbell 1991; Campbell and Ammer 1993; Vuolteenaho 2002) . Several accounting studies advance this strand of volatility literature by using accounting-based proxies of cash-flow news at the firm level (Callen and Segal 2004; Callen et al. 2005; Callen ５ et al. 2006) or at the market level (Sadka 2007). Our paper complements these studies and examines the role of non-accounting information news, an analyst-based cash-flow proxy, in generating both systematic and idiosyncratic stock return volatility.
Our theoretical predictions and subsequent empirical confirmation contribute to our understanding of how non-accounting information contained in analysts' forecasts affect stock return volatility. While it is well accepted that earnings forecasts have an important influence on stock prices, and analysts' forecast revisions and recommendations are associated with subsequent abnormal returns, there is only limited research in terms of stock return volatility. Ajinkya and Gift (1985) and Daley et al. (1988) find that the ex ante variability of stock returns around earnings announcements (obtained as implied volatility from option prices) is positively related to analysts' forecast dispersion. Abarbanell et al (1995) present a rational expectations model, which predicts that analysts' forecast dispersion and the ex ante variance of price changes should be positively related during earnings announcement periods.
Prior studies examining financial analysts' forecasts and stock return volatility concentrate on studying periods around earnings announcements, and only document a short-term relationship between analysts' forecast dispersion and ex-ante variance of stock returns. Moreover, prior empirical studies do not offer a direct theoretical link between analysts' forecasts and the ex post variance of stock returns, nor do they provide any consistent empirical evidence on this issue.
Finally, our results also contribute to the extant accounting literature that considers the extent to which Ohlson's linear information dynamic is actually supported in stock price data. Empirical studies by Bar-Yosef et al. (1996) and Myers (1999) suggest that Ohlson's model is of limited empirical validity. However, these studies are subject to the criticism that they do not adequately account for the non-accounting information variables in the Feltham-Ohlson framework. They either disregard the non-accounting information variables entirely or substitute specific historical information for them such as order backlogs. Ohlson (2001 ), together with Hand (2001 , suggests that analysts' consensus forecasts of next-year earnings would seem to be a reasonable measure of expected earnings, which maintains the model's "objective expectation"
spirit. Dechow et al. (1999) were the first to use analysts' earnings forecasts to ６ substitute for the non-accounting information variables, and they report evidence that supports the economic modelling of residual income as an autoregressive process. In contrast, most extant studies examine the importance of the non-accounting information variable using market prices or stock returns. We provide additional insight on the importance of non-accounting information by examining the link between information in analysts' forecasts and the variance of stock returns.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops our model of the relationship between stock return volatility and the uncertainty of non-accounting information contained in analysts' forecasts. Sample construction, the measurement of non-accounting information variables, descriptive statistics and correlation analysis are discussed in Section 3. Section 4 outlines the results of cross-sectional regressions linking the uncertainty of non-accounting information and stock return volatility. The decomposition of total volatility into systematic and idiosyncratic volatilities is also examined. Further robustness analysis is considered in Section 5. Evidence that the results are not driven by institutional factors, the properties of analysts' forecasts and other potentially relevant factors is summarized. Additional tests on the effect of non-accounting information news on volatility are summarized in Section 6. Section 7 concludes.
Hypothesis development
At the most fundamental level, stock prices are the sum of expected future payoffs adjusted by the appropriate discount rates. Campbell and Shiller (1988a, 1988b ) use a loglinear approximation to represent the relation between prices, dividends and returns, which provides an accounting framework where high prices must be associated with high expected future dividends, low expected future return, or some combination of the two. Using the variance decomposition approach, Campbell (1991) and Campbell and Ammer (1993) find that expected-return news dominates dividend news in driving equity returns at the market level. However, although the extant literature often focuses on dividends as a proxy for future cash flows, dividends are subject to the discretion of managers (Lintner 1956 ) and do not necessarily reflect changes in fundamentals, or at least not on a timely basis.
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To mitigate these problems, Vuolteenaho (2002) uses the definition of the book to market ratio and the accounting clean surplus relation (Ohlson 1995) to replace dividends in the Campbell-Shiller model, and establishes a new link between unexpected stock returns and changes in the future discount rates, and expected future ROEs as follows;
where r it is the return on stock i in period (t-1, t), ROE i,t+j is the return-on-equity in period (t+j-1, t+j), f t+j is the risk-free rate for period (t+j-1, t+j), ρ is a constant slightly less than one, and κ it is an approximation error. In equation (1) 
where ξ i,t-1 encompasses the conditional variances of the expected-return news and the conditional covariance between the cash flow news and expected-return news.
The key fundamental variable in our study is the return-on-equity (ROE). To comply with Vuolteenaho's (2002) accounting version of the Campbell-Shiller model, we use an equivalent to Ohlson's ROE-based information dynamic based on abnormal earnings. The economic intuition behind Ohlson's linear information dynamic is that competition will erode above-normal returns or firms experiencing below-normal rates of returns will eventually exit. Providing that the normal level of ROE is equal to r, a typical firm's ROE satisfies the following autoregressive process:
where v t is non-accounting information, namely information about future earnings not in current earnings, w and φ are fixed persistence parameters that are non-negative and less than one, u t and ε t are the unpredictable, mean zero disturbance terms.
After some simple algebra, we have 1 t t t 1 t
ROE ROE
where c (= r(1 -w) ) is the intercept. The intuition of the main hypothesis is that given the assumption of market efficiency, that is, stock prices fully reflect the implications of current earnings for future earnings, then if current non-accounting information is more uncertain, thereby increasing the uncertainty of future cash flows, future stock returns will be more volatile. 4 Hence, the uncertainty of non-accounting information contained in analysts'
forecasts contributes to the fluctuations of future stock returns.
If the above hypothesis holds, it is also of interest to examine whether non-accounting information contained in analysts' forecasts (mainly) drives cross-sectional 4 A large part of the accounting literature suggest that the market is naive in recognizing the time-series properties of earnings encapsulated in public financial accounting information, and hence causes significant post-earnings-announcement abnormal returns (e.g., Bernard and Thomas 1989, 1990) . However, recent studies seek to refine the understanding of the drift. Brown and Han (2000) suggest the market is not entirely naive, but underestimates the parameters of the true process. In particular, Abarbanell and Bernard (1992) conclude that the market's failure to accurately process the time-series properties of earnings is due in part to dependence in analysts' forecast errors. The stock return volatility of firm i at year t is defined as follows:
where is the daily return on stock i, at day d in year t, is the average daily
To avoid survivorship bias in the sample selection, we ensure that all active and inactive firms on the three stock exchanges are included in the sample, so that the population of firms within each exchange and each year represents, as near as possible, the 'true' population of firms that existed over the sample period.
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return on stock i in year t, and D t is the number of trading days in year t. RETURN in year t is defined as annual buy-and-hold stock returns. Duffee (1995) advocates the use of contemporaneous returns as a control based on the notion that the realizations of expected return and risk have a common component. LEV in year t is defined as the sum of long-term debt and current liabilities over book value of total assets. The cross-sectional association between stock return volatility and financial leverage is expected to be positive, as highly leveraged firms are more likely to experience financial distress (see Bushee and Noe (2000) , Pástor and Veronesi (2003) and Wei and Zhang (2006) ). Table 1 summarizes the measurement of all variables.
Measurement of non-accounting information
The non-accounting information variable is operationalized using two distinct approaches. We use V1 (V2) to represent the non-accounting information variable estimated from the first (second) approach outlined below. As discussed in section 2, we use realized volatility of non-accounting information as a non-parametric estimator of the conditional variance of non-accounting information, denoted as VV1
9 Following Pástor and Veronesi (2003), we also define age in period t as the logarithm of the number of months from the listing date of the firm in the CRSP to the current period t. The results are qualitatively similar.
１３ (VV2). VV1(VV2) is defined as the sample variance of the yearly V1 (V2)
observations over the past five years (with a minimum of three observations). The measurement of the non-accounting information variables is summarized in Panel C
of Table 1 .
Our first approach to measuring non-accounting information parallels the approach in Ohlson and Shroff (1992) and Manry et al. (2003) for identifying new information in reported earnings (i.e., unexpected earnings). The non-accounting information variable is measured as the residual from regressing one-year-ahead analysts'
forecasts on current publicly available financial information. Hence, we run the following cross-sectional regression to estimate non-accounting information contained in analysts' forecasts that is not contained in earnings or net book value;
where, for each firm i, FROE i,t is the one-year-ahead consensus analyst forecast of earnings per share at year t divided by book value of equity per share at year t, BVPS i,t is net book value of equity per share at year t, and v t is residual which proxies for non-accounting information. A separate regression of equation (9) is estimated for each fiscal year, with each regression using all available observations from that year.
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The results of the cross-sectional estimation for the pooled sample from 1981 to 2003
are tabulated in Panel A of Table 2 . Previous literature suggests that the definition of actual EPS reported in I/B/E/S is more consistent with the analyst forecast of EPS. We therefore run an alternative version of regression equation (9) where ROE i,t is replaced by AROE i,t (namely I/B/E/S ROE, measured by the actual earnings per share of year t+1 reported in I/B/E/S divided by book value of equity per share at year t).
The explanatory power of the regression for ROE is 45.78%, much higher than that for AROE (14.28%). This indicates that ROE calculated from financial reports is more informative in predicting one-year-ahead analysts' forecasts than AROE. It is worthy of note that the intercepts of both regressions are positively significant, suggesting a systematic positive difference between the one-year-ahead forecasts and 10 We also estimate a separate regression for each fiscal year, with each regression using all available observations in the sample from previous years, going back as far as 1981. The main results still hold.
１４ past actual earnings.
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Our second approach is consistent with Ohlson's (2001) suggestion that the non-accounting information variable, v t , can be interpreted as the difference between the conditional expectation of earnings for period t+1 based on all available information and the expectation of earnings based only on current period earnings.
12
We follow Dechow et al (1999) and Ohlson (2001) who use the consensus analyst forecast earnings to measure the year t conditional expectation of year t+1 earnings.
The expectation of earnings based only on current period earnings is estimated from the AR(1) process of ROE. Thus, the non-accounting information variable can be interpreted as v t = FROE t -(c + wROE t ). 13 Here FROE t is the one-year-ahead consensus analyst forecast of earnings per share at year t+1, divided by book value of equity per share at year t. Both c and w are parameters of the ROE process. (1996) suggests that earnings persistence is negatively affected by extreme accruals while Fairfield et al. (1996) find that firms with extreme level of non-recurring special items tend to have lower persistence of profitability.
We employ market share (the ratio of firm's sales to total industry sales), firm size (the natural logarithm of total assets), R&D intensity (R&D expenditures over sales), advertising intensity (advertising expenditure over sales), capital intensity (the ratio of depreciation, depletion and amortization to sales), the magnitude of earnings (the absolute value of ROE), the magnitude of special items (the absolute value of the ratio of special items to lagged book value) and the magnitude of total accruals (the absolute value of the ratio of total accruals to lagged total assets) in the estimation of ROE persistence. 14 To avoid any undue influence by outliers, we winsorize these variables at the bottom and top 1% levels. The measurement of the determinants of ROE persistence is summarized in Panel D of Table1.
The conditional value of ROE persistence (w) used in calculating non-accounting information variable is estimated as follows. We first estimate earnings auto regressions in which each of the eight determinants of ROE persistence are included as interactive effects:
where F i,t is the i'th persistence determinant, i=1, 2, …,n, n is the number of variables used in the estimation with a maximum of eight. A separate regression of equation (10) is estimated for each fiscal year, with each regression using all available observations of that year. 15 The conditional estimated value of ROE persistence for each firm-year is then computed using the parameter estimates from this regression and the 14 While Lev (1983) argues that industry-barriers-to-entry is more appealing than industry concentration ratio in capturing different degrees of competition, we do not use industry-barriers-to-entry because the coding for this measure is not available for about half of the industries in the sample. For the same reason, the type of product variable is not used in this study. 15 Following Dechow et al. (1999) , we also estimate a separate regression for each fiscal year, with each regression using all available observations from previous years, going back as far as 1950. The results are similar to those reported in the text.
１６
firm-years actual values of the eight determinants of ROE persistence:
If one of the variables required to calculate w is missing, then the respective term is set equal to 0. indicating that earnings persistence is lower when earnings contain more transitory accounting items. Market share, firm size and proxies for firm-level barriers to entry (R&D and advertising intensity) are found to be positively significant, which is consistent with the prediction from neo-classical economic theories that firm characteristics affecting profitability are not homogeneous across industries. We first analyse the pair-wise correlation between five measures of stock return volatility, non-accounting information variables and other control variables. 18 Most of the correlations are significant, a natural consequence of using a large dataset.
Descriptive statistics
Although this may be an indication of multicollinearity within the models, it is clear that no pairwise correlation exceeds 0.4 in absolute values. VV1 and VV2 are positively related to total volatility, with correlation coefficients of 0.198 and 0.208 respectively. Overall, the correlation results show that all five measures of stock return volatility have a consistent positive relation with the volatility of non-accounting information (VV), which is consistent with our predictions.
Results

Analysts' forecasts and total volatility
We begin with a set of pooled time-series and cross-sectional regressions of total 17 Further analysis is presented in the section 5. 18 For brevity, correlations are not presented here, but are available upon request.
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volatility on the non-accounting information variables, as well as the control variables discussed above:
where VOL i,t is the volatility measure of stock i in year t, as defined in (8). V i,t-1 is the measure of non-accounting information in year t-1. LOG(VV i,t-1 ), the volatility of non-accounting information, is defined as the natural logarithm of the sample variance of V within the past five years. The lagged volatility measure of stock i, VOL i,t-1 , are used to account for volatility clustering. All independent variables, with the exception of the contemporary return variable R i,t , are lagged by one period to allow the market sufficient time to incorporate financial statement information into stock return volatility, and to avoid simply reporting a contemporaneous association between stock return volatility and non-accounting information. We also divide our sample period into two equal length sub-periods, namely 1981-1992 and 1993-2003, and estimate equation (12) for the two sub-samples separately. The results for different time periods are essentially the same, so are not １９ reported in detail. Overall, the results in Table 4 support the main hypotheses that future stock return volatility is significantly positively associated with the variance of non-accounting information. The coefficients on VV1 and VV2 are statistically significant in all specifications.
Fama-MacBeth and fixed effect regressions
The inferences above about the association between the uncertainty of non-accounting information and stock return volatility are based on a pooled time-series and cross-sectional regression, where multiple annual observations for the same firm are used. However, failure to control for unobserved individual heterogeneity (e.g. time, firm) may bias the resulting estimates. On the other hand, as stock return volatility is persistent (Schwert (1989)), the standard errors of the coefficients in equation (12) may be biased downward.
To mitigate concerns about serial correlation of the standard errors, we examine the robustness of our results to a Fama-MacBeth estimation of equation (12). Panel C of Table 4 reports the estimated coefficients using this procedure. We first estimate coefficients in equation (12) 
Systematic volatility versus idiosyncratic volatility
Having established the theoretical and empirical cross-sectional relation of stock return volatility with the uncertainty of non-accounting information, we now turn to the second question in this study. Fundamental variables can cause both systematic and idiosyncratic variation in stock returns. Although it is widely held that most fundamental variables cause idiosyncratic volatility at the firm level, the relative importance of the uncertainty of non-accounting information on systematic versus idiosyncratic volatility is ultimately an empirical issue. Similar to Malkiel and Xu (2003), we rely on the CAPM and the Fama-French three factor model (Fama and French 1993, 1996) as benchmarks for volatility decomposition.
For each measure of systematic or idiosyncratic volatility, we estimate the coefficients in regression (12). The estimated coefficients are shown in Tables 5 and 6 . The results support the view that a typical firm's volatility of non-accounting information is associated with difference in both the systematic and idiosyncratic components of volatility. For brevity, we focus on the influence of our V1 measure on systematic and idiosyncratic volatility estimated from Fama-French three factor model. The coefficients on VV are significantly positive in all specifications of either systematic or idiosyncratic volatility. For instance, when combined with all control variables, the magnitude of the VV1 coefficient on systematic volatility is 0.060, with a significant t-statistic of 13.99. As idiosyncratic volatility accounts for nearly 90% of total volatility, it is not surprising that the main results are repeated for idiosyncratic volatility. But the magnitude of the VV1 coefficient is smaller (coefficient = 0.025; t = 11.60), compared to that on systematic volatility.
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Additional tests
In this section, the relation between stock return volatility and the uncertainty of non-accounting information is confirmed by a battery of robustness checks. The robustness analysis generates qualitatively similar results to those presented above; that is, an almost identical pattern of signs and statistical significance arises across all of the checks. Space constraints limit the following discussion to focusing on total volatility only, but the results for idiosyncratic and systematic volatility are similar and are available upon request.
NASDAQ versus NYSE/Amex stocks
We separately examine results for NASDAQ-traded stocks from those traded on the NYSE/AMEX for several reasons. Schwert (2002) (Huang and Stoll 1996) , both of which may differentially influence our volatility analyses. Of our full sample, 38% of all firm-years are from NASDAQ while the rest come from NYSE/AMEX. We therefore repeat all of the analysis described in Tables 4, 5 and 6 for each sub-sample. Without exception, the results support our hypotheses irrespective of whether we examine NASDAQ firms or NYSE/AMEX firms.
Industry effects
Roll (1992) finds that industry factors can explain substantial variation in national stock returns. The importance of industry factors in equity returns has also emerged in the recent literature on the momentum effect. Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999) find that industry momentum strategies in the U.S. are profitable after controlling for size, book-to-market ratio and individual security's momentum effects, and attribute this result to the existence of time-varying industry risk premiums. Firms in different industries might also display different stock price volatility for other reasons. For instance, firms that operate in finance-related industries (e.g. banks, insurance, life ２２ assurance and investment companies) and utility industries (e.g. water, electricity and gas distribution companies) are highly regulated and have to comply with stringent legal requirements pertaining to their financing. To control for possible industry effects, the entire sample is divided into five subsamples according to the Fama and French five-industry classification. 19 We repeat the analysis in Tables 4, 5 and 6 for each sub-sample and find that the results are robust across different industries.
New listing, high technology and loss firm effects
Fama and French (2004) Table 7 . The number of firm-year observations for "old firms"
is 10,479, slightly larger than that for "new firms" (n=8,895). The results suggest that the VV coefficients continue to be significantly positive for "old firms". Indeed, the magnitude of the VV coefficient for "old firms" is quite similar to that for "new firms" (e.g. using V1, the comparison is 0.028 compared to 0.027). Hence, the link between stock return volatility and non-accounting information documented thus far does not appear to be driven by an increase in new listings. The resulting sub-sample of "tech" firms (n = 3,339) is about one-sixth of the whole sample. Results reported in Panel B of Table 7 are supportive of our hypotheses. For both "tech" and "non-tech" firms, VV is found to be positively associated with stock return volatility. The magnitude of the VV coefficient for "non-tech" firms (for VV1, coefficient = 0.030) is close to that for "tech" firms (coefficient = 0.031). Therefore, the above results indicate that the empirical results are not a by-product of the increased importance of high-technology firms.
Collins et al. (1999) and Givoly and Hayn (2000) document a monotonic increase in the frequency of losses over the last five decades. Hayn (1995) shows that the market reaction to a loss is systematically different to the response to positive earnings. Given the increasing number of loss firms in recent times, the relationship between non-accounting information and stock return volatility may be attributable to the effect of losses. Hence, we classify firms into loss firms and profit firms according to their earnings in a specific fiscal year. Not surprisingly, the proportion of loss firms is less than one-fifth as large as that of profit firms (3,130 vs. 16,244) . The results are shown in Panel C of Table 7 . For profit firms, the relation between VV and stock return volatility is still statistically significant. However, these relations are weaker in the case of losses (e.g. using V1, the comparison is 0.010 compared to 0.032). Overall,
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our results appear robust to firms that make losses in the sample.
Controlling for attributes of analysts' forecasts
Studies by Ajinkya and Gift (1985) and Daley et al (1988) find that the ex-ante variability of stock returns around earnings announcements is positively related to analysts' forecast dispersion. Ackert and Athanassakos (1997) further show that analysts' forecast dispersion is positively associated with analyst optimism. When there is greater uncertainty about a firm's fundamentals, analysts have fewer reputational concerns in issuing optimistic forecasts. In addition, when few analysts follow a firm, an analyst has little competition and more opportunity to generate business by issuing an optimistic report. In addition to forecast dispersion, many studies also provide evidence that analyst coverage reduces the extent of information asymmetry (e.g. Lang and Lundholm 1996). Alford and Berger (1999) confirm a negative relationship between forecast optimism and analyst coverage. Given that future stock volatility might be positively related to forecast dispersion, a negative relationship is expected between stock return volatility and analyst coverage, and it is also expected that higher forecast accuracy (i.e., lower optimism) is associated with lower future stock volatility. Because the link between the uncertainty of non-accounting information and stock return volatility may be driven by specific properties of analysts' forecasts, such as forecast dispersion, analyst coverage and forecast bias, we estimate the following modified version of equation (12) where X i is a proxy for forecast dispersion, analyst coverage or forecast bias.
Forecast dispersion is defined as the standard deviation of forecasts divided by the absolute value of consensus forecast. 20 Analyst coverage is the number of analysts following the firm in the forecast period. Forecast bias is defined as the difference 20 The deflator is commonly used to reduce heteroskedasticity. We also introduce a minimum denominator (0.10) as a filter to alleviate small denominator problems associated with low earning forecasts. The main results are qualitatively similar to those reported in Table 8 .
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between FROE and AROE. Unlike forecast dispersion and analyst coverage, forecast bias here is an ex post variable. The results reported in Table 8 indicate a cross-sectional positive relation between VV and stock return volatility. As expected, forecast dispersion is found be significantly positively related to stock return volatility.
However, the adjusted R square of equation (13) is lower than for regressions without forecast dispersion. For V1, the adjusted R square declines from 69.04% to 63.90%, indicating that the inclusion of forecast dispersion does not contribute to the explanatory power. Contrary to expectations, the relation between analyst coverage and stock return volatility is positive. Overall, the main results continue to hold after accounting for the effect of forecast dispersion, analyst coverage and forecast bias on stock return volatility.
The effect of non-accounting information "news" on volatility
Our previous analysis focuses on the effect of the volatility of non-accounting information on stock return volatility. As the level of non-accounting information (what we term "non-accounting information news") can be thought of as the aggregate news of all value-relevant events that have yet to have an impact on the financial statements, the relation between non-accounting information news and future stock return volatility is of particular interest, absent any theoretical predictions from our model.
Volatility can be linked to the quantity and quality of information pertaining to firm's fundamentals. According to this view, the most important processes affecting volatility is the news arrival process (Ross 1989; Andersen 1996) . Numerous studies have examined the price reaction to news release, and the most common conclusion is that firm-specific news increases stock return volatility after the release of information (e.g. Beaver 1968; Atiase and Bamber 1994; Clayton et al. 2005) . Since volatility tends to be clustering (Mandelbrot 1963; Schwert 1989) , the effect of news releases tends to continue and thereby influence future stock return volatility through the channel of volatility clustering. 21 This implies that stock return volatility is the smallest when there is no news (i.e., the level of non-accounting information is equal 21 Volatility clustering means "large changes (in the price of an asset) tend to be followed by large changes, of either sign, and small changes tend to be followed by small changes" (Mandelbrot 1963).
２６ to zero).
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On the other hand, extensive research has found that stock return volatility increases more in response to negative news than in response to positive news, which is called volatility asymmetry. The ARCH-related literature provides a rich set of studies on this issue (Christie 1982; Nelson 1991; Glosten et al. 1993; Engle and Ng 1993) .
Beyond research using a time-series setting, previous cross-sectional studies such as Skinner and Sloan (2002) and Chan (2003) also find that individual stocks experiencing the public release of bad news display a stronger reaction for up to 12 months.
Two strands of literature attempt to provide the theoretical framework to better explain asymmetry in the response of stock return volatility to news. The first, based on research in behavioural psychology, suggests that investors inappropriately extrapolate past performance, and thus bad news has a particularly telling impact after a long period of good news because it has the effect of correcting overoptimistic projections (Daniel et al. 1998; Barberis, Shleifer and Vishny 1998) . 23 However, the behavioural models do not predict that the market will respond more strongly to bad news in bad times, and the notion of volatility asymmetry does not necessarily require the assumption of irrationality or overreaction on the part of investors.
The second strand of literature relates to regime-switching, rational equilibrium models. Veronesi (1999) suggests that the asymmetric response occurs because news affects not only expected cash flows, but also the risk associated with the probability of a regime shift. In good times, bad news decreases future expected cash flow and increases investors' uncertainty about a regime shift of the cash flow process.
22 Damodaran (1985) suggest that investors react to news in different ways depending on how they think the information affects the future payoff of their asset and how big a surprise the information was for them. Given that the level of non-accounting information is an aggregate indicator of all non-accounting information news, the relation between non-accounting information news and volatility can be ambiguous, according to Damodaran's model (1985) . 23 For example, to reconcile the empirical findings of overreaction and underreaction, Daniel et al. (1998) use psychological concepts of overconfidence and self-attribution to construct a model of investor sentiment in the sense that "stock prices overreact to private information signals and underreact to public signals" (p. 1,841). Barberis et al. (1998) model investors as typically (but not always) believing that earnings are more stationary than they really are. In such a situation, bad news following a series of good news generates a large negative response because it is a surprise, whereas good news generates little response because it is anticipated.
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Risk-averse investors thus require a higher discount rate for bearing the increasing risk of a regime shift, and this reinforces the effect of the bad news in good times.
However, there is no similar reinforcement in the case of good news, thus volatility increases more in response to bad news. On the other hand, good news in bad times increases the risk associated with a change in the regime and, thereby, causes the discount rate to rise. The rising discount rate offsets the effect of the good news, but such offset does not occur in the case of bad news.
Overall, we expect that future stock return volatility increases following either a favourable non-accounting information shock ("good news") or a unfavourable one ("bad news"), and the response to unfavourable non-accounting information news is stronger than that for favourable news.
We estimate the following modified version of equation (12) information news on total, idiosyncratic and systematic volatility are shown in Table 9 .
As the difference between the results using V1 and V2 is small, for brevity, we focus on discussing the results for V1 as reported in Panel A. When only V + and V -are included, the estimated coefficient is 1.742 (t = 17.74) and -3.968 (t = -30.69),
indicating that both good news and bad news on non-accounting information increase future volatility. Stock return volatility also tends to increase more in response to bad news than good news. The magnitude of the V -coefficient is significantly higher than that of the V + coefficient, according to the Wald test for β 2 equal -β 3 . These results continue to hold when the dummy variable D is included, though the magnitude of the V + and V -coefficient decreases significantly. However, when combined with all control variables including the uncertainty of non-accounting information, the effect of non-accounting information news on volatility appears to be symmetric, with an insignificant χ 2 of 1.320. This implies that the volatility asymmetry in response to non-accounting information news is likely to be driven by firm characteristics (e.g.
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ROE, firm size, financial leverage) and volatility clustering. We repeat our analysis for idiosyncratic and systematic volatility and find that the results are qualitatively similar. Overall, we find that both favourable and unfavourable non-accounting information news increase future stock return volatility, but the response of volatility to unfavourable news is not significantly stronger than that for favourable news.
Conclusion
This paper proposes a simple rational model to illustrate how the uncertainty of non-accounting information in analysts' forecasts, compared to financial statement numbers, contributes to stock price fluctuation. How analysts' forecasts affect stock prices is an important topic and has been widely investigated. The influence of analysts' forecasts on stock returns is better understood than its effect on stock return volatility. Our model offers a direct theoretical link between analysts' forecasts and future stock return volatility, and this research is among the first to empirically identify the role of non-accounting information from analysts' forecast as an important factor associated with stock return volatility. The time series properties of stock return volatility are better understood than the cross-sectional patterns, with only limited evidence on what drives cross-sectional differences in volatility. This study contributes to the research along this line. Finally, the results also make a contribution to the conflicting evidence on how Ohlson's linear dynamics are actually supported by stock price data. This study focuses on the variance of stock returns rather than market prices or stock returns, and therefore offers empirical evidence of the importance of non-accounting information from another perspective.
We show that when combined with Ohlson's (1995) linear information dynamics, the accounting version of the Campbell-Shiller model implies that when non-accounting information (i.e., analysts' earnings forecasts) is more uncertain, the future stock return of the firm is more volatile, ceteris paribus. We also demonstrate empirical support for the predicted link between stock return volatility and non-accounting information, even after controlling for other relevant firm-specific variables.
Importantly, we also find that the pattern holds with respect to both systematic and Our results support the view that information in analysts' forecasts beyond that reflected in current financial statements is an important indicator of fundamentals, and as a result uncertainty in this variable is associated with cross-sectional differences in stock return volatility. For managers concerned with the firm-specific risk component of stock volatility, our results suggest that attention to the richness of the information environment for the stock may be warranted. Managers may not necessarily be able pro-actively to achieve lower market volatility, let alone idiosyncratic volatility, but they can take an active role in ensuring the richness of firm's information environment, thereby reducing the uncertainty of a firm's information about fundamentals.
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Appendix: Details in Deriving the Main Hypothesis
Recall that the ROE-based information dynamic is that ROEs satisfy the following autoregressive process:
where v t is non-accounting information, namely information about future earnings not in current financial information, w and φ are fixed persistence parameters that are non-negative and less than one, c is the intercept, u t and ε t are the unpredictable, mean zero disturbance terms. 
Given (A3.2) and (A3.3), the change of expectation of ROE t+j can be written as: Finally, we obtain;
Therefore, we have the representation of equation (6); where, for each firm i, FROE i,t is the one-year-ahead consensus analyst forecast of earnings per share at year t divided by book value of equity per share at year t, BVPS i,t is net book value of equity per share at year t, and v t is residual which proxies for non-accounting information. A separate regression of Equation (9) Dechow et al (1999) and Fama and French (2002) to estimate the persistence of ROE as a function of known economic determinants, including market share (the ratio of firm's sales to total industry sales), firm size (the natural logarithm of total assets), R&D intensity (R&D expenditures over sales), advertising intensity (advertising expenditure over sales), capital intensity (the ratio of depreciation, depletion and amortization to sales), the magnitude of earnings (the absolute value of ROE), the magnitude of special items (the absolute value of the ratio of special items to lagged book value) and the magnitude of total accruals (the absolute value of the ratio of total accruals to lagged total assets). The process of ROE is as follows,
where F i,t is the i'th determinant of ROE persistence, i=1, 2, …,n, n is the number of variables used in the cross-sectional estimation. A separate regression of equation (10) is estimated for each fiscal year, with each regression using all available observations of that year. Following Dechow et al (1999) . VOL is a proxy for total volatility, idiosyncratic volatility or systematic volatility respectively. Non-accounting information variables are calculated by paralleling the approaches in either Ohlson and Shroff (1992) or Dechow et al (1999) (denoted as V1 and V2 respectively). The volatility of non-accounting information, VV, is the sample variance of V within the past five years for a minimum of 3 observations. Control variables include ROE Return-on-equity, VROE the sample variance of ROE, RETURN the contemporaneous annual buy-and-hold returns, SIZE the natural logarithm of the firm's market value of equity, AGE the logarithm of the number of years from the tracking date of the firm appearing in the COMPUSTAT to the current year, LEV the sum of long-term debt and current liabilities over the book value of total assets, and BM the ratio of the book value of equity to the market value of equity. For Fama-MacBeth regression, the coefficients are time-series averages of cross-sectional estimates. . VOL is a proxy for total volatility, idiosyncratic volatility or systematic volatility respectively. Non-accounting information variables are calculated by paralleling the approaches in either Ohlson and Shroff (1992) or Dechow et al (1999) (denoted as V1 and V2 respectively). The volatility of non-accounting information, VV, is the sample variance of V within the past five years for a minimum of 3 observations. Control variables include ROE Return-on-equity, VROE the sample variance of ROE, RETURN the contemporaneous annual buy-and-hold returns, SIZE the natural logarithm of the firm's market value of equity, AGE the logarithm of the number of years from the tracking date of the firm appearing in the COMPUSTAT to the current year, LEV the sum of long-term debt and current liabilities over the book value of total assets, and BM the ratio of the book value of equity to the market value of equity. . VOL is a proxy for total volatility, idiosyncratic volatility or systematic volatility respectively. Non-accounting information variables are calculated by paralleling the approaches in either Ohlson and Shroff (1992) or Dechow et al (1999) (denoted as V1 and V2 respectively). The volatility of non-accounting information, VV, is the sample variance of V within the past five years for a minimum of 3 observations. Control variables include ROE Return-on-equity, VROE the sample variance of ROE, RETURN the contemporaneous annual buy-and-hold returns, SIZE the natural logarithm of the firm's market value of equity, AGE the logarithm of the number of years from the tracking date of the firm appearing in the COMPUSTAT to the current year, LEV the sum of long-term debt and current liabilities over the book value of total assets, and BM the ratio of the book value of equity to the market value of equity. . VOL is a proxy for total volatility, idiosyncratic volatility or systematic volatility respectively. Non-accounting information variables are calculated by paralleling the approaches in either Ohlson and Shroff (1992) or Dechow et al (1999) (denoted as V1 and V2 respectively). The volatility of non-accounting information, VV, is the sample variance of V within the past five years for a minimum of 3 observations. Control variables include ROE Return-on-equity, VROE the sample variance of ROE, RETURN the contemporaneous annual buy-and-hold returns, SIZE the natural logarithm of the firm's market value of equity, AGE the logarithm of the number of years from the tracking date of the firm appearing in the COMPUSTAT to the current year, LEV the sum of long-term debt and current liabilities over the book value of total assets, and BM the ratio of the book value of equity to the market value of equity. "New firm" ("old firm") refers to firms listed on the three exchanges after (before) 1983. Firms in the 14 three-digit SIC codes (283, 357, 360-368, 481, 737 and 873) are identified as technology-intensive industries (Francis and Schipper (1999) . VOL is a proxy for total volatility, idiosyncratic volatility or systematic volatility respectively. Non-accounting information variables are calculated by paralleling the approaches in either Ohlson and Shroff (1992) or Dechow et al (1999) (denoted as V1 and V2 respectively). The volatility of non-accounting information, VV, is the sample variance of V within the past five years for a minimum of 3 observations. Control variables include ROE Return-on-equity, VROE the sample variance of ROE, RETURN the contemporaneous annual buy-and-hold returns, SIZE the natural logarithm of the firm's market value of equity, AGE the logarithm of the number of years from the tracking date of the firm appearing in the COMPUSTAT to the current year, LEV the sum of long-term debt and current liabilities over the book value of total assets, and BM the ratio of the book value of equity to the market value of equity. X i is a proxy for forecast dispersion, analyst coverage or forecast bias. Forecast dispersion is defined as the standard deviation of forecasts divided by the absolute value of consensus forecast. Analyst coverage is the number of analysts following the firm in the forecast period. Forecast bias is defined as the difference between the forecast and actual ROE. Figures in parentheses are VV, is the sample variance of V within the past five years for a minimum of 3 observations. Control variables include ROE Return-on-equity, VROE the sample variance of ROE, RETURN the contemporaneous annual buy-and-hold returns, SIZE the natural logarithm of the firm's market value of equity, AGE the logarithm of the number of years from the tracking date of the firm appearing in the COMPUSTAT to the current year, LEV the sum of long-term debt and current liabilities over the book value of total assets, and BM the ratio of the book value of equity to the market value of equity. For Fama-MacBeth regression, the coefficients are time-series averages of cross-sectional estimates. 
